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A recent innovation in artificial intelligence, known as Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs), has
enabled computers to generate images that are visually indistinguishable from photographs. GAN images,
sometimes called “deepfakes”1, have already been recognized to pose an epistemic threat to society by
undermining the capacity of photographs to provide evidence. In this paper, I will investigate both the
epistemic status and the potential aesthetic value of GAN images, as well as how the proliferation of GAN
images will aect the epistemic and aesthetic value of true photographs. I will arm the view that GAN
images are a potential epistemic threat, but also argue that they are nevertheless a medium with significant
potential for artistic expression. To do so, I will draw upon Dawn Wilson’s argument that photographs are
ontologically dual and can be considered as both mind-independent “photo-images” and mind-dependent
“photo-pictures”. I will extend that argument to GAN images to show that, while they are indeed the outputs
of mind-independent computer algorithms that do not provide information about real objects in the world,
they can also be skilfully generated in a way that can embody artistic intentions. Consequently, I will argue
that if GAN images and photographs become indistinguishable, then photographs will come to occupy a
role in society similar to that of paintings today, in that they will lose their epistemic authority but continue
to be valued aesthetically.
1 Introduction
The goal of this paper is to investigate the philosophical implications ofGenerativeAd-
versarial Networks (GANs), an innovation in articial intelligence that enables computers
to generate images that are visually indistinguishable fromphotographs. GAN images are
known as “deepfakes” in the popular press, which has already recognized them to have
immense social and political implications. However, little has been said with regards to
their potential aesthetic value, or their potential impact on the aesthetic status of true
photographs. I will aim to answer two questions. First, what are the epistemic and aes-
thetic statuses of GAN images? Second, how will the epistemic and aesthetic statuses of
true photographs change if they become fully indistinguishable from GAN images?
In Section 2, Iwill analyse the contemporary debate around the epistemic and aes-
thetic value of photographs to provide a basis for similar arguments regarding GAN im-
ages. In that section, I will introduce two sceptical arguments that discount the aesthetic
value of photographs and introduceWilson’s ontology of photographs to reject those scep-
tical arguments. In Section 3, I provide a substantive account of the GAN image process
1The term “deepfake” is oen to refer to images (or videos) of people created for deceptive or salacious purposes. In this paper I
will use the term ‘GAN image’ to refer more broadly to all photorealistic images generated by GANs, regardless of their purpose or
content.
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in order to ground an epistemic and aesthetic analysis in the following two sections. In
Section 4, I will argue that GAN images indeed pose a threat to the epistemic value of
photographs. In Section 5, I will attempt to adapt the sceptical arguments introduced
in Section 2 to target GAN images and utilize a modied form of Wilson’s arguments to
demonstrate that GAN images have a potential for artistic expression on par to that of
photographs. I conclude in Section 6 that the impending shi in the role of photography
due to the proliferation of GANs is not unprecedented, as it will likely be similar to the
eect that the invention of photography itself had upon the previously dominant artform
of painting.
2 The Duality of Photographs
Photographs are commonly thought to occupy a dual role in society. As epistemic tools,
photographshave anunparalleled ability to reliably recordwhat someobjects in theworld
looked like at some time. Simultaneously, photography is one of the most widely used
aesthetic media in the world. Photographs oen full either of these two roles: this is
evident through a glance at the average smartphone camera roll, which might contain
pictures of important documents (epistemic tool) as well as colourful sunsets (artistic
expression). Crucially, some photographs full both roles. For instance, a portrait of a
former pet may be valued not only for its ability to serve as a reminder of how the pet
once looked, but also for its aesthetic properties.
However, examining the assumptions that underlie this commonview illuminates
a potential tension between these two roles. Photographs are usually considered to be
epistemically valuable because they are “mind-independent”: the appearance of a photo-
graph is causally determinedby the state of thephysicalworld, independent of any agent’s
intentions. On this view, photographs are more valuable epistemic tools than paintings
or drawings, which are produced through the intentions of an artist. On the other hand,
if we accept the widespread2 claim that art must be intentionally produced (for instance,
as formulated by Nick Zangwill3), the possibility that photography can be art implies that
photographs must possess some degree of “mind-dependence”. The dual epistemic and
aesthetic roles of photography appear to pose the contradiction that photographs simul-
taneously possess mind-independence and mind-dependence.
2.1 Arguments Against Photographic Duality
Some philosophers, such as Roger Scruton, sidestep this apparent contradiction by sim-
ply denying that photographs have a dual nature. Given that the causal dependence of
photographs on certain physical features of the world is easily observable, it seemsmuch
plausible to dispensewithmind-dependence and claim that photographs are solelymind-
independent. This singular thesis of mind-independence can be utilized in multiple dis-
2Paisley Livingston, Art and Intention: A Philosophical Study (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 35–40.
3Nick Zangwill, “The Creative Theory of Art,” American Philosophical Quarterly, no. 32 (1995): 307–23.
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tinct sceptical arguments purporting to show the impossibility of aesthetic expression in
photographs.
One such sceptical argument posits that photographs too closely resemble reality
to deserve any aesthetic interest for their own sake. On this view, which I call “trans-
parency scepticism”, photographs are, by nature, transparent depictions of reality and
deserve no aesthetic interest in themselves. The transparent relationship between pho-
tographs andwhat theydepict thus simultaneously justiesphotography’s epistemic value
and dooms its aesthetic value. The most provocative such argument comes from Roger
Scruton, who controversially claims that “with an ideal photograph it is neither neces-
sary nor even possible that the photographer’s intention should enter as a serious factor
in determining how the picture is seen”.4 According to Scruton, the ideal photograph is
“recognized at once forwhat it is—not as an interpretation of reality but as a presentation of
how something looked”.5 Scruton’s ideal photograph is the epitome of an epistemic tool,
as it enables one to obtain reliable information about the appearance of an object. How-
ever, because the nature of the ideal photograph is to faithfully reproduce reality, there is
no need to consider the intentions of the photographer. On Scruton’s transparency scep-
tic view, ideal photographs are entirelymind-independent and aremerely “ameans to the
end of seeing its subject”.6
A second argument, which I call “mechanical scepticism”, posits that the creation
of a photograph is dominated by mechanical and non-human processes that interfere
with the transmission of a human intention. Mechanical scepticism dates as far back
as 1865 in a highly dogmatic form claiming that photography lacks “something beyond
mere mechanism” and cannot be “the expression of man’s delight in God’s work”.7 More
recently, it has been utilized in a less extreme form by Nigel Warburton, who argues that
photographers must personally certify that their photographs actually full their artis-
tic intentions in order to guarantee their aesthetic value. Warburton broadly denes the
process of certication as a “conferral of status” and argues that means of certication
include “signing, stamping, exhibiting, [or] printing the image in a certain context”8. Ac-
cording to Warburton, such certication is the only way “in which photographers over-
come the expressive limitations of a process that is largely automated”,9 and photographs
lacking certication “can never be reliable indicators of a photographer’s intentions”.10
Warburton’s mechanical scepticism characterizes photography as a medium whose po-
tential artistic value is undermined by the fact that it contains mind-independent auto-
matic processes, and Warburton argues that this issue can only be mitigated through an
additional mind-dependent mark.
Transparency scepticism and mechanical scepticism proceed from the same as-
sumptionabout thephotographicprocess: the claim that photographs are created through
a mechanical, mind-independent process. However, they dier crucially in that the for-
mer targets the content of a photograph, and that the latter targets the causal history of
4Roger Scruton, “Photography and Representation,” Critical Inquiry 7, no. 3 (1981): 588.
5Scruton, "Photography and Representation", 588. Italics mine.
6Scruton, "Photography and Representation," 590.
77 “Art and Photography,” The New Path 2, no. 12 (1865): 198–199.
8Nigel Warburton, “Authentic Photographs,” The British Journal of Aesthetics 37, no. 2 (1997): 134.
9Warburton, “Authentic Photographs,” 135.
10Warburton, “Authentic Photographs,” 135.
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a photograph. A sucient rebuttal of the idea that photographs are intrinsically mind-
independent would weaken both transparency and mechanical scepticism, as well as
other views that deny the ability of photographs to earn our aesthetic interest.
2.2 Photo-Image and Photo-Picture
Dawn Wilson (publishing as Phillips) poses a solution to the apparent contradiction by
proposing that photographs have a dual ontology and exist as both “photo-image” and
“photo-picture”. According to Wilson, the photo-image refers to the visual appearance of
a photograph, and “visual properties of the photo-image supervene on... those properties
caused by the photographic event [and] material production process”.11 The photo-image
is the photograph considered in a purely material sense: its properties are causally de-
termined bymechanical, mind-independent objects and processes. By contrast, a photo-
picture “has intentional content as [a product] of human design”,12 and the “properties
of the photo-picture also supervene on the intentions of the artist”.13 According to Wil-
son, skilful manipulation of the photographic process allows a photographer to create a
photograph that fulls the purpose of a photo-picture. Wilson writes:
The skilled photographer can form intentions to create a visual image that will
have particular properties. The photographer is not simply at the mercy of the
photographic process; but instead uses photographed objects, along with the
camera apparatus, in accordance with a skilled understanding of the photo-
graphic process, to create photo-images that have those particular visual prop-
erties. In this way a photograph can full the intentions of a photographer as
much as a painting can full the intentions of a painter.14
Wilson’s characterization of skilful photography poses an eective rebuttal to both
transparency and mechanical scepticisms. In the case of transparency scepticism, Wil-
son concedes that “when we take an interest in a photo-image, wemay be concerned with
[the photographed] objects”.15 This allows that Scruton’s argument to be correct only if
we consider the photograph qua photo-image. Yet by viewing the process of producing
a photograph qua photo-picture, i.e., through the lens of a skilled photographer’s inten-
tional actions surrounding the actual photographic event, Wilson brings to light that an
artist’s intention, far from being invisible in the causal history of a photograph, in fact
leaves an indelible mark upon it. All this is to suggest that there is in fact capacity for an
artist’s intention, and therefore aesthetic value, in a photograph.
Meanwhile, in the case of mechanical scepticism, Wilson’s appreciation of pho-
tographers’ skilful manipulation of the photographic process suggests that the sophisti-
cated mechanical processes involved in photography simply make available a greater set
11Dawn M. Phillips, “Fixing the Image: Rethinking the ’Mind-Independence’ of Photographs,” Postgraduate Journal of Aesthetics 6,
no. 2 (2009): 13.
12Phillips, “Fixing the Image,” 5.
13Phillips, “Fixing the Image,” 20.
14Phillips, “Fixing the Image,” 18.
15Phillips, “Fixing the Image,” 19. Italics mine.
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of tools with which photographers can realize their intentions. Historically, technologi-
cal advances have broadened the expressive range of photographs. For instance, prior to
the invention of colour photography, photographers had only light and dark to establish
contrast in a photograph, but today they can also utilize warm and cool colours to eect
further contrast. By understanding the photographic process as a means to the end of an
artist, Wilson dismissesWarburton’s concern that automatism limits creative expression.
On the contrary, mechanical sophistication only empowers an artist’s expression.
Wilson’s description of the photographic process is particularly compelling be-
cause it permits photography to full both epistemic and aesthetic roles without compro-
mise. Instead of deningmind-independence andmind-dependence as directly opposed,
Wilson conceives of themind-independence of a photo-image and themind-dependence
of a photo-picture as independent traits. I believe that Wilson’s account of photography
satisfactorily justies the dual roles of photography, and that it is useful for analysing
photographs in terms of their epistemic and aesthetic value. To determine how Wilson’s
argument relates to GAN images, we must now investigate the process by which GAN im-
ages are created.
3 The GAN Image Process
In this section, I will briey describe the process by which a GAN is used to generate an
image. While the GAN image process involves a great deal of algorithmic computation,
it also requires a signicant amount of human operation that centres on three factors.
The rst is the selection of the “training set”, a database of images which the GAN learns
to imitate. The second is the choice of a “seed number”, which the GAN mathematically
transforms into an image resembling one from the training set. The third is the nal step
of curating images produced by the GAN.
A GAN consists of a competing pair of algorithms, a “generator” and a “discrimi-
nator”. The generator is tasked with turning random numbers called “seeds” into images
that resemble those from the training set. The discriminator then receives a mix of im-
ages created by the generator and images from the training set and attempts to determine
the origin of each image. Both algorithms receive the discriminator’s results anduse them
to improve through trial and error: the generator learns to operate more closely to when
it succeeded in deceiving the discriminator, while the discriminator learns from its mis-
takes. Over time, the generator learns to turn any seed number into an image that the
discriminator would guess is part of the training set.16
Notably, if the training set depicts one kind of object, then the GAN will produce
images that appear to depict the same kind of object. For instance, a GAN trained with
photographs of human faces will generate images resembling human faces. As proof
of the photorealism of GAN images, consider the two faces in gure 1 and attempt to
determine which was computer-generated.
16"Overview of GAN Structure |Generative Adversarial Networks,” Google Developers, accessed Jan 4, 2020,
developers.google.com/machine-learning/gan/gan_structure.
Aporia Vol. 21 57
Figure 1: One face was generated by the GAN powering thispersondoesnotexist.com17
Aer training, the generator can be provided an arbitrary seed number to con-
vert into an image. Using other AI techniques, it is possible to select a seed that further
inuences the appearance of the output. One particularly interesting application turns
linguistic descriptions into seeds that generate images matching the description. Figure
2 contains images generated from descriptions of birds by various algorithms developed
from 2016 to 2018 (lower rows show newer results).18 While the results of even the latest
algorithms are not quite as realistic as the above faces, it is likely that the quality of these
images will continue to increase in time to become equally photorealistic. These results
illustrate that the seed number, which can be deliberately selected, has a strong inuence
upon the appearance of the generated image.
In total, the GAN image process oers three opportunities to manipulate the ap-
pearance of the nal image. First, the selection of an appropriate training set circum-
scribes the possible appearance of all generated images. Second, the choice of a seed
number allows one to inuence the appearance of the image within the boundaries set
by the training set. Finally, the curation of GAN-generated images allows selection of
the results that best t certain criteria, which can range from simple photorealism, to
correspondence with a description, to even specic visual qualities that full an artistic
intention.
1818 Han Zhang et al., “StackGAN++: Realistic Image Synthesis with Stacked Generative Adversarial Networks,” IEEE Transactions on
Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence 41, no. 8 (2019): 1954, g. 3.
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Figure 2: Results from various GANs trained to generate images of birds according to image descriptions.
Reproduced from Han Zhang et al. with permission.
4 The Epistemic Value of Generated Images
4.1 Probabilistic Visual Information
As discussed in Section 2, photographs are commonly understood to be epistemically
valuable in virtue of their mind-independence. Here, the term “mind-independence”
refers specically to amind-independent counterfactual relation to the portrayed object.
For instance, if a photograph is taken of a person’s face, then a change in the person’ fa-
cial expression necessitates a like change in the photograph — the photograph will show
a smile if and only if the person is smiling. This dependence is invariant with respect
to any mind, as the photograph will show a smile regardless of the mental state of the
photographer or viewer. Indeed, this relation persists even if the photograph is taken by
a computer-controlled security camera. However, this idea about mind-independence is
merely an intuition, not a rigorous epistemic argument.
In a pair of papers,19 20 Cohen and Meskin analyse the process by which we pur-
port to gain knowledge fromphotographs. On their account, photographs are not sources
of knowledge (dened as justied true belief), but of “information”, which Cohen andMe-
19Jonathan Cohen and Aaron Meskin, “On the Epistemic Value of Photographs,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 62, no. 2,
(2004): 197–210.
20Aaron Meskin and Jonathan Cohen, “Photographs as Evidence,” in Photography and Philosophy, ed. Scott Walden (Malden: Black-
well 2008) 28 Jan. 2009: 70–90.
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skin dene as a “probabilistic, counterfactual-supporting, connection between indepen-
dent variables”.21 Their denition of information is two-pronged: A carries information
about B only if, rstly, A is likely to be very close in value to B (probabilistic connection),
and secondly, a change in B will result in a change in A (counterfactual). Having dened
information, Cohen and Meskin assert that photographs “typically provide information
about many of the visually detectable properties of the objects they depict”.22 Thus, if
a photograph carries information, then its appearance resembles the appearance of the
object it depicts, and any change in the depictum causes a corresponding change in the
photograph. Additionally, Cohen and Meskin clarify that “informational links are con-
stituted independently of any subject’s beliefs or mental states”23, which introduces the
condition of mind-independence. This claim is similar to the mind-independence the-
sis with which we are already familiar, but it diers signicantly in that it operates with
regards to information, not knowledge or belief.
Images generatedbya computer donotnecessarily have a similarmind-independent
counterfactual correlation with the appearance of their depicta. While the images gen-
erated by a GAN algorithm resemble those of the training set, this resemblance does not
support counterfactuals relating to specic concrete objects. For instance, the images at
thispersondoesnotexist.com depict faces that vary in age, gender, skin tone, and other
features, yet they do not provide information about any actual person. GAN images can-
not carry information as photographs do about their depicta.
4.2 Salient Image Categories and Epistemic Value
Cohen and Meskin concede that the capacity of a medium to carry information is dis-
tinct from our belief that the medium actually carries information. To underscore the
importance of this distinction, Cohen and Meskin propose the example of courtroom il-
lustrations and veridical portrait paintings, which carry information about their subjects
because they probabilistically and counterfactually resemble their depicta. Nevertheless,
our beliefs about them dier, and “we do not accord the same epistemic status to realistic
portrait paintings as we accord to photographs”.24
To explain our beliefs that photographs carry information, Cohen and Meskin ex-
amine the background social practices involved when we interpret images. According to
Cohen andMeskin, whenwe encounter a token photograph, we “typically categorize that
token as an instance of the type of photographs” and deem it epistemically reliable.25 By
contrast, when we encounter even the most realistic portrait painting, we “typically do
not categorize that token as an instance of the type of veridical portrait paintings” but
instead “an instance of the type of portrait paintings” and deem it epistemically unreli-
able.26 The dierence between these examples consists in that the “type [of photographs]
21Cohen and Meskin, “Epistemic Value,” 7.
22Meskin and Cohen, “Evidence,” 3.
23Meskin and Cohen, “Evidence,” 3.
24Cohen and Meskin, “Epistemic Value”, 15.
25Cohen and Meskin, “Epistemic Value”, 16.
26Cohen and Meskin, “Epistemic Value”, 16.
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is salient for subjects in a sense that these other types [portrait paintings] are not”.27 Most
of us believe that photographs, paintings, and drawings are salient types of images— only
the rst of which is a reliable carrier of information — but that veridical portrait paint-
ings and courtroom drawings are not salient types, despite the information they actually
carry. CohenandMeskin remark that “both the saliencyordering among representational
types and the generally-held background beliefs about these types are, presumably con-
tingent”.28 According to this view, if our beliefs change and the salience of photographs
as a type of image diminishes, then it is possible that we would judge token photographs
to fall under a salient type of image that does not reliably carry visual information and
photographs would lose their epistemic value.
If GAN images become so photorealistic as to become indistinguishable from true
photographs, then true photographs will cease to be a salient category of image. Just
as veridical portrait paintings and non-veridical portrait paintings both fall under the
salient category of portrait paintings, GAN images and digital photographs would likely
both fall under the category of the “photorealistic image” as a whole. Because the uni-
ed category of photorealistic image contains both information-carrying photographs
and information-devoid GAN images, the category cannot be said to reliably carry in-
formation. Although photographs would retain their ability to carry information — there
could certainly be no change to the content of pre-existing photos — on the level of belief,
theywould be judged to be simply “digital images”with no epistemic value. Thus, the pro-
liferation of photorealistic GAN images may entirely strip photographs of their epistemic
status.
5 The Aesthetic Value of GAN Images
5.1 Aesthetic Scepticism and Technologial Advancements
Recall from Section 2 the arguments I termed transparency scepticism and mechanical
scepticism. Despite their archaic roots, the two sceptical arguments might seem to be in-
creasingly justiedbyhistorical andmodern advances in photographic technology. In the
case of transparency scepticism, one might claim that the argument has been strength-
ened by improvements in the resolution and colour delity of digital cameras. If the ar-
gument of transparency scepticism applies to a scratchy, blurry, black-and-white photo-
graph that signicantly distorts reality, then it most denitely applies to a 24-megapixel
image from a cutting-edge digital camera.
In a similar vein, the argument of mechanical scepticism is also strengthened by
technological advancements. Pressing the shutter button on an iPhone is far more “auto-
matic” than spending twentyminutes exposing a delicate daguerreotype plate to light and
curing it with noxious chemicals. Amechanical scepticmight therefore argue that the hu-
man element in photography has continuously diminished over time to a comparatively
27Cohen and Meskin, “Epistemic Value”, 16.
28Cohen and Meskin, “Epistemic Value”, 19.
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innitesimal amount in the present. would follow that the aesthetic value of photography
has decreased in parallel.
Given that both sceptical arguments discussed are strengthened by recent devel-
opments in photography, it is possible that the arguments will also apply convincingly
to GAN images, which represent yet another step forward in image technology. If these
arguments do indeed successfully diminish the artistic value of GAN images, and GAN
images become indistinguishable from genuine photographs, then it is possible that all
digital images, genuine photographs included, will be relegated to an inferior aesthetic
status.
5.2 Are GAN Images Mind-Independent?
If GAN images are entirely mind-independent, then the sceptical arguments against the
aesthetic value of photography may also apply equally to GAN images. In Section 4, we
showed that GAN images have amind-independent relation to their training set and seed.
However, as we have seen in Wilson’s analysis of photography, this is not to say that
GAN images are entirely mind-independent. Wilson justies her view that a photograph
qua photo-picture is mind-dependent by characterizing photography as a process that
involves intentional decisions made by the skilled photographer throughout the photo-
graphic process.
The same can be said for GAN images. As described in Section 3, during the GAN
image process the image creatormakes three choices: the selection of a training set (gen-
eral appearance), the choice of a seed (specic appearance), and the curation of output
images. These three opportunities for deliberatemanipulation of the GAN image process
have analogous opportunities in the photographic process. The selection of the training
set, which determines the general appearance of generated images, is similar to a photog-
rapher’s selection of a scene or object to photograph. Just as the choice of a training set
consisting of images of human faces will cause the nal image to resemble a human face,
a photographer’s choice to photograph a person will cause their resulting photograph to
depict a person. Next, the seed, which determines the appearance of the image within
the boundaries of the training set, is analogous to a photographer’s selection of a vantage
point and camera settings, such as focal length, shutter speed, and exposure. While the
seed for a non-intentional GAN image can be random, so too can a non-intentional photo-
graph be taken on automatic settings from an arbitrary vantage point. But skilled photog-
raphers control these factors to inuence the appearance of their nal image, and I argue
that creators of GAN images can do the same by selecting a seed. Finally, the curation of
GAN images is identical to a photographer’s curation of their best work from a session —
a wedding photographer may capture a thousand photographs but only determine a few
dozen to be satisfactory. If we accept Wilson’s argument that the photographic process is
sucientlymind-dependent to full artistic intentions, then these parallels with the GAN
image process suggest the same about the latter.
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5.3 Dispelling Aesthetic Scepticism Regarding GAN Images
Let us consider the arguments of transparency and mechanical scepticism to determine
whether they are applicable to GAN images, and then attempt to adapt Wilson’s stance
to rebut them if they do. Transparency scepticism, especially in Scruton’s formulation,
assumes the premise that, in their “ideal form”, photographs are reproductions, not in-
terpretations, of reality. In the terminology of Section 4, photographs are meant to carry
visual information. Even if we accept this essentialist view of photographs and grant that
the information-carrying “ideal form” of photography precludes artistic expression, it is
also clear that this argument simply does not apply toGAN images. GAN images, as shown
in Section 4, do not carry visual information and do not resemble any existing object. As
such, transparency scepticism falls at against GAN images and provides no basis for
denying their potential aesthetic value.
Having dispensed with transparency scepticism against GAN images, let us now
turn to mechanical scepticism. The mechanical sceptic argument against photography
holds that the presence of mechanistic processes in photography reduces the ability of
photographs to reliably transmit the original intentions of the photographer. This argu-
ment applies GAN images with little to nomodication— if anything, GAN images can be
said to use evenmore automatedprocesses thandoes photography. However,Wilson’s ob-
jection to mechanical scepticism successfully defends the aesthetic value of GAN images
with little to no modication as well. As a mechanical sceptic, Warburton might claim
that the creator of a GAN image leaves even less of a trace upon their work than a photog-
rapher does, and that theymust further compensate for that loss of agency through some
personal certication. However, as inspired by Wilson’s argument, so long as the GAN
image process still allows an image creator to determine the content of the resulting GAN
image in accordance with an artistic intention, the resulting image, qua picture, can still
transmit that intention and bear artistic value. Wilson’s view states in short that the var-
ious image-making processes—painting, photography, even GANs — exist to help artists
realize their intentions, and that artistic intentions are fullled through those processes,
not limited by them.
Thus, scepticism about the aesthetic value of photography is equally as inapplica-
ble to genuine photographs as it is to GAN images. Just as photography can be mastered
by a skilled photographer to produce images of a desired visual appearance that bears an
artistic intention, so too can the GAN image process allow for a skilled image creator to
full their artistic intentions through the skilful use of that process. Wilson’s character-
ization of photographs as a duality of photo-image and photo-picture can be applied to
GAN images; it is possible for a skilled individual to create not just a GAN image, but a
GAN picture.
GAN images and photographs are two very dierent kinds of images in terms of
their production, but they both are deserving of aesthetic interest in their own unique
manner. While other arguments that GAN images are intrinsically aesthetically inferior
to other visual media may exist, I argue that the most widely held such views will rely on
the same awed thesis of mind-independence that is used to justify similar arguments
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against photographs. Given that in the art world photographs are widely believed to be a
full-edged visual artform comparable to painting, I believe that, barring the emergence
of totally novel objections, GAN images may soon join photographs and paintings on the
walls of the art gallery.
6 Implications: The End of the Photographic Age
In 1958, lm theorist André Bazin called the invention of photography “clearly the most
important event in the history of the plastic arts”.29 On Bazin’s account of the evolution
of visual art, prior to the invention of photography “painting was torn between two am-
bitions: one, primarily aesthetic. . . the other. . . to duplicate the world outside”. In other
words, paintings once occupied the dual epistemic and aesthetic role that photography
fulls today.30 Bazin claims that the invention of photography “freed Western painting,
once and for all, from its obsession with realism”.31 According to Bazin’s chronology of
painting, the period between the development of perspective — the “original sin of West-
ern painting”32—and the invention of photographywas a dark age inwhich painterswere
torn between epistemic and aesthetic commitments. Aerwards, painters abandoned
their imagined obligation to realism, ushering in in a golden age of creativity.
Just as Bazin uses the invention of photography to delineate the “dark age” and
“golden age” of painting, the proliferation of GAN images presents another boundary,
in this case between two ages of photography. Taking inspiration from Bazin, I propose
to call the period of time in which photographs occupied their dual epistemic-aesthetic
role in society the “Photographic Age”. The Photographic Age began with the invention
of photography, and, as I have argued in this paper, it may end with the invention of the
GAN image.
As we stand in the last days of the Photographic Age, there remain two practical
problems to solve, each corresponding to one of the aspects of photography. First, the
loss of photography as a ubiquitous and trusted epistemic tool indeed poses a threat to be
mitigated, whether through an eort to prevent the perceptual merging of the categories
of photographs andGAN images, or through an attempt to inform the public about the im-
pending crisis of epistemic unreliability. Second, for the sake of artistic innovation, we
ought to maintain permissive denitions of aesthetic value such that the GAN image pro-
cess and photography can both be used to their full potential, rather than adopt dogmatic
and exclusionary denitions of art that stymie the creation of new works. Photography
has long been a special source of information and a cherished artistic medium, but our
best hope for its future in the face of technological advances is to enjoy the new artistic
possibilities created by articial intelligence while avoiding the threats that it poses.
29Andre Bazin and Hugh Gray, “The Ontology of the Photographic Image,” Film Quarterly 13, no. 4 (1960): 9.
30Bazin and Grey, “Ontology”, 9.
31Bazin and Grey, “Ontology”, 6.
32Bazin and Grey, “Ontology”, 7.
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